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Jellyfishing in the Postcolonial Nation State
Baltistan through the Zomia Lens
The Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 divided the western Himalayan 
region of Baltistan in two parts. Being subject to internal colonization and 
nation-making by the two postcolonial nation states, the Balti community, like 
many other communities in the Himalayan region, has recently voiced demands 
for self-rule and experienced a cultural revival. The situation in Baltistan is 
here seen through a Zomia lens, focusing on what James Scott (2009) terms 
“jellyfish” strategies of the community’s history, language, and culture to avoid 
being governed. This strategy allows for the community’s escape from their 
rulers into a new, “virtual friction of terrain” in the form of ICT (information 
communications technology) and the internet. This article points out that South 
Asian minority communities like the Balti often find themselves suspended 
between demands of self-rule and a politics of development where they compete 
over access to the resources of the nation state. A preliminary history of 
connectivity in Baltistan is also included.
Keywords: Baltistan—Himalayas—Zomia—connectivity—internal colonialism—
self-rule
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When I was an undergraduate student studying political science at Lund University in Sweden, the class read Graham Allison’s book Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971). It is a book that investigates the Cuban 
Missile Crisis from three different theoretical perspectives in order to show how 
the researcher’s choice of theoretical lenses brings out and emphasizes different 
aspects in the explanation and interpretation of the events (and to challenge the 
dominant rational choice model at that time). The book made a deep impression on 
me that, I think, has led me to be consistently unfaithful to theory, to try and shift my 
perspectives and cut through the empirical data differently.
When I first read James C. Scott’s book The Art of Not Being Governed (2009), I found 
myself wondering what I would see in my previous research about Baltistan, a region in 
the western Himalayas, if I looked at it through a Zomia lens. Zomia is Scott’s name for 
a Southeast Asian upland region that has “not yet been fully incorporated into nation 
states” (ibid., ix). The reason, he suggests, is that the people who were living in Zomia did 
their best “to keep the state at arm’s length” (ibid., x) by deploying various strategies.
What perhaps struck me the most when I first put my mind to the study of 
Baltistan was how many of the things that were going on in the region today were 
linked to the community being a disadvantaged minority demanding civil rights in 
a postcolonial nation state. Up until that point I had mainly been approaching the 
issues as a sociologist taking a social movement perspective, often with a tilt toward 
identity politics. But I never really did question the nation state framework. What if 
I got it all wrong? Like many other communities that ended up on the peripheries of 
the new, independent nation states of India and Pakistan, Baltistan became an object 
of internal colonialism and state- and nation-making, part of a new geography with a 
new geopolitical agenda. What would I discover if I looked at the activities and events 
that I had documented in Baltistan through a Zomia lens, as parts of a strategy to, if 
not avoid, at least try to maneuver away from the governing attempts of the new, 
postcolonial rulers?
It made me curious. In my view, Scott’s work on Zomia challenges much of history 
writing as we know it and is a groundbreaking piece of work in its alternative reading 
of state-making. In my examination of the Zomia quality of Baltistan’s relationship 
with the nation states of India and Pakistan in this article, I do not attempt to do full 
justice to it. Instead, I will merely try to make use of some parts of the conceptual 
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framework, taking my cue from the Zomia literature (van Schendel 2002; Scott 2009; 
Michaud 2010, 2017; Schneiderman 2010; Samuel 2015; and others).
Quite a lot of criticism has been leveled against the Zomia thesis, especially 
from historians and anthropologists of Southeast Asia. The challenge has mainly 
been two-pronged. First, Scott’s argument is too general and lacks a solid empirical 
base and, second, he is a reductionist due to taking methodological shortcuts 
and oversimplifying the issues (Michaud 2017). For instance, according to Victor 
Lieberman, a historian of Southeast Asia and Eurasia, the evidential base presented 
in The Art of Not Being Governed is too weak to support the theoretical superstructure 
(2010, 336). In his opinion, the thesis is both ahistorical and one-sided, as it omits local 
dynamics within the hills and only offers a single, monocausal explanation in the form 
of “lowland provocation.” He goes on to demonstrate this at length by suggesting 
other, contradictory contexts and alternative explanations (ibid.). Political scientist 
and Marxist scholar Tom Brass, a well-known researcher in subaltern studies, also 
lashes out at Scott’s work, calling it a “populist historiography” (Brass 2012, 124) based 
on “ecological determinism” (ibid., 127) where the hills are good, and the valleys are 
bad, and where development and modernization are portrayed as historical evils. 
In his eyes Scott’s work represents a neoliberal, even libertarian agenda celebrating 
a society that is free from the state (ibid., 126). A portion of the criticism against 
the theoretical basis of Scott’s concept of Zomia also points out that it is more of a 
metaphor that, in effect, invents a reality rather than describes it (Jonsson 2010, 192).
I find it hard to argue against the empirical and methodological challenges, 
but I disagree with those who want to disqualify Zomia as a theoretical approach. 
Whatever the faults of Scott’s thesis might be, its strength is the lens it offers for a 
reversal of perspectives. In fact, this exercise could be seen as one of the major tasks 
for social scientists. As Jean Michaud (2010) points out in his editorial in Journal of 
Global History’s special issue on Zomia, picking up from Willem van Schendel’s (2002) 
challenge to area studies, the Zomia lens is an opportunity to explore other sides of 
marginality in the Asian highlands that are outside the nation state framework and 
what has been regarded as comme il faut answers by mainstream research.
As I will discuss later in this article, there are indeed alternative readings of 
modern Baltistan that can be discovered through the Zomia lens about its history, 
culture, and people. The readings that I intend to propose contest the master 
narratives of the nation states, some of them crossing paths in the current Baltistan 
Movement to create an autonomous geographical entity called “Greater Ladakh.” I 
will use the term “Baltistan Movement” in this article as a label for the cultural revival 
and its political turn that has been going on in the Balti community over the past 
three decades. The keenest propagators are activists involved with local NGOs such 
as Skarchen (Morning Star) in the Indian part of Shyok Valley, KASCO (Kargil Social 
and Cultural Organization) in Kargil, and BCDF (Baltistan Culture and Development 
Foundation, formerly BCF, Baltistan Cultural Federation) in Skardu, organizations 
that I have studied closely during fieldwork in the region (Magnusson 2006, 2011a, 
2011b, 2016).
I will also discuss if the so-called “jellyfish” strategies are deployed in the 
construction of the history of Baltistan. If so, is it a post-literate community by 
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strategic choice? Also, are the recent efforts to reclaim the Tibetan u-chen script for 
vernacular Balti a double-edged sword? Is the performance of Balti pop-ghazals a way 
of sharing alternative narratives within the community and preventing them from 
being appropriated? Lastly, do community activities carried out on social media get 
protected by what I call the “friction of virtual terrain”? These are the main questions 
that I attempt to explore in what follows in this article.
Competing nationalisms and the religious framework of national identities
When we talk about Baltistan not wanting to be governed by Pakistan or India, it 
suggests a resistance against being incorporated into the master narratives of the 
nation states. It also assumes a distinct national identity propagated by these two 
countries. But it can alternatively suggest that there is a different Balti narrative, 
identity, and heritage that is separate from those of the nation states within which 
they are located, and that Baltistan might have different ethnolinguistic and 
socioeconomic interests.
On the one hand, the master narratives of post-Partition nationalisms are what 
Charles Tilly (1994, 133) calls a “state led” nationalism based on the idea that the 
people (that is, the citizens) “identify themselves with the nation and subordinate 
their interest with that of the state” (ibid.). Minority community nationalism, on the 
other hand, is a “state-seeking” nationalism where the community claims autonomy 
or a separate state, “on the grounds of having a distinct, coherent cultural identity” 
(ibid.). As we shall see, in reality, the coherence of the Baltistan Movement’s state-
seeking nationalism is contested both in terms of who belongs to the community, the 
nature of its heritage, and its geographical boundaries.
In Subrata Mitra’s (1995, 57–58) terms the Baltistan Movement can be classified as 
a post-independence, sub-nationalist movement. As such, it provides a special case of 
cultural nationalism:
These separatist movements are seen by governments as fissiparous tendencies 
and threats to law and order. The “subnationalists”, themselves, however, contest 
the authority of the successor “nation” states, and consider them claims justified 
by their unique identities derived from their affinity with a particular language, 
religion, ethnicity or region.
According to Mitra (ibid., 58), what seems to be distinctive of the South Asian sub-
nationalist movements is that they mix national sentiments, such as independence, 
with material and economic interests, such as access to the state’s development 
resources. Separation from the master culture of the nation state can thus contradict 
the movement’s “politics of development.” Another significant feature of such 
movements is their participation in transactional politics, where they become rivals 
in competition over the state’s resources. Their claims to legitimacy often draw 
on “language, race, ethnicity, history, and geography” (ibid., 61).1 Looking back at 
attempts of autonomy, succession, or self-determination in post-Partition India and 
Pakistan they have, in all instances so far, proved counterproductive (Fazal 2012, 
165–66).
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A component of nationalisms that is not taken into account so much by Mitra is 
the use of religion as ideology for post-Partition, state-led nationalisms. When his 
article was published in 1994 India had only recently begun to abandon its secular 
politics to let the nation’s communal Hindu/Muslim conflict take its logical course, as 
witnessed, for instance, by the destruction of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992 and the 
violent riots targeting Muslims in Gujarat ten years later. Another telling example of 
religious nationalism, as staged by the dancer and choreographer Venuri Perera in her 
dance performance titled Kesel Maduwa, narrated by Susan Reed in this special issue, is 
Sri Lanka’s civil war and continuing adversity between Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu 
Tamils, which has now spread to engulf other religious minorities on the island.
In his contribution to this special issue Peter van der Veer talks about religion as 
the essence of Indian nationalism, where the Muslim minority is seen as secondary 
citizens and made the target for national mobilization. Religion is the source of 
national identification. It is nationalized to provide the framework for a national 
identity. As is clear from Mari Miyamoto, Jan Magnusson, and Frank Korom’s 
contribution, this is also true about Bhutanese nationalism, where the regime is 
trying to fix the national identity within a specifically Buddhist framework. In 
Charles Taylor’s (2017, 14–15) terms, this kind of national identity “disembeds” the 
people, making it “independent of any particular social order or community” they 
might have belonged to before (as quoted in van der Veer, this issue). It does not, 
however, “disenchant” it. In fact, it might just accomplish the opposite.
The other side of the Line of Control (hereafter LoC) is subject to the Hindu 
nationalization discussed by van der Veer but not targeted in the same violent and 
discriminatory way as in Sunni-dominated Pakistan. The Shi‘i community in Pakistan 
has been variably estimated as being between 5 and 25 percent of Pakistan’s total 
population.2 The Shi‘ah are mainly based in Sindh, the Kurram Valley, and Gilgit-
Baltistan, with others residing in major cities, such as in Karachi and Lahore. Their 
persecution in the Indian subcontinent traces back several hundred years. It was 
somewhat tempered during the colonial period but returned with strong force after 
Partition, culminating in June 1963 when the Muharram processions were attacked 
“in the worst anti-Shia violence so far” (Rieck 2016, 331).
The Shi‘ah were disadvantaged and continued to suffer during the military rules of 
Generals Zia ul-Haqq and later Pervez Musharraf, when sections of the Sunni majority 
were radicalized and turned to violent terrorism. At the forefront was the militant 
terrorist group called Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi) that killed numerous Shi‘i 
Muslims in repeated terror attacks during the decade of 2003 to 2013 (ibid., 336).3
Although sectarian clashes have been more common in Gilgit, they also take place 
in Baltistan. The Baltistan Movement’s combination of state-seeking nationalism with 
Shi‘i faith makes it an attractive target for Sunni/state counterterror activism. In the 
1980s, the pro-Sunni Anjuman-Sipah-e-Saba, encouraged by Zia-ul-Haqq, extended 
its activities to Skardu, where sectarian differences over the moon sighting to mark 
Eid-ul-Fitr in May 1988 led to a violent clash of the two communities, wounding and 
killing hundreds of people (Feyyaz 2011).4
During my fieldwork in Skardu in 1994, the hotel in which I was staying was burnt 
down by a street mob of Sunni hooligans marching down the Main Bazaar. Shi‘i-
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owned vehicles passing through Sunni dominated regions on their way to or from the 
south were frequently ambushed with shoulder-fired missiles and automatic high-
speed assault rifles.
Baltistan after Partition, especially the development of connectivity
Baltistan is a high-altitude region in the western Himalayas. After Partition it was 
split in two parts by the Line of Control, leaving the Balti community forcibly divided 
on both sides of the border. Unlike many border areas that are usually quite porous 
and permeable, the rugged geography and a never-ending conflict between India 
and Pakistan shut the LoC tight. Cross-border interaction within the community 
became almost non-existent. Together with Gilgit, Baltistan formed the Northern 
Areas of Pakistan, until the Government of Pakistan issued the “Gilgit-Baltistan 
Empowerment and Self Governance Order” in 2009 (see Ministry of Kashmir Affairs 
and Northern Areas 2009). However, because the territory is still under dispute, it 
is not a formal province. This region is where a large part of the Balti community in 
Pakistan has resided historically and contemporaneously. Baltistan is divided in two 
administrative parts—Skardu and Ghanche. The most recent census conducted in 1998 
counted 303,214 persons living in Baltistan (214,848 in Skardu and 88,366 in Ghanche). 
On the Indian side of the border, Baltis live in the districts of Kargil or Ladakh. Balti 
villages are found in the Hardas area just west of Kargil, in Wakha, southwest of Kargil 
near Mulbekh on the road to Leh, and in Shyok Valley (Turtuk, Taksi, and Thang) 
northwest of Ladakh. In the latest Indian census, conducted in 2011, the population of 
these villages, taken together, was 7,613 persons.5 Scattered groups also live in Kargil 
(which has a Balti neighborhood called Balti Bazaar) and in Leh.
The Balti community consists predominantly of Ismaili Shi’ites or Nurbakhshi 
Muslims.6 The two groups taken together as a single community of Shi‘i Muslims form 
a large majority, perhaps as large as 80 percent, in the area. The vernacular language 
that they speak is a Tibetan dialect.
For the Balti community, Independence, Partition, then division meant the 
transition from one mode of colonial domination and subalternity to another 
(Sökefeld 2005). The new, internal colonizers were the Indian and the Pakistani 
nation states. With them came state- and nation-making projects and new master 
narratives founded on the contention between India and Pakistan, as well as between 
religious faiths. As peripheral parts of two rather different states the trajectories 
of the two Balti communities also became different, with the community in India 
being a little better off. The life of the Baltis residing on the Pakistani side of the LoC 
was conditioned by the unclear geopolitical status of the territory, which resulted 
in limited infrastructural investments and a lack of civil rights. For many years, for 
example, it was impossible for Baltis to make cross-border phone calls or to obtain a 
travel visa. Contacts between the communities were few. Some people would meet 
while on pilgrimage or when studying abroad and sometimes carry family letters and 
photographs (Magnusson 2006).7
Clearly, when the communities living in these peripheral regions of the Himalayas 
were first internally colonized it was not in order to improve their lives by making 
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them citizens, giving them access to the benefits of the state, or even to impose 
the hegemony of a master narrative. This rhetoric arrived later. The interventions 
of India and Pakistan in Baltistan were driven by the hostility between the two 
states after Partition. A military infrastructure was put in place along both sides of 
the border all the way up to Siachen Glacier, the infamous highest battleground of 
the modern world. It meant the construction of support lines in the shape of roads 
and airstrips. Transport and communications infrastructures were put in place, but 
they were not really accessible to the local communities. When a proper road was 
completed between Srinagar and Kargil in 1964 it was not because of the conflict with 
Pakistan but rather a reaction to the trouble with China, the construction of a Chinese 
military road along the border in the second half of the 1950s, and the Sino-Indian 
conflict in 1962. It would take another ten years before the road was permanently 
open to civilian traffic.8
Not surprisingly, Pakistan nurtured a closer relationship with China. In the late 
1950s the two governments decided to cooperate in the construction of what was then 
termed a “Friendship Road” that would cut through the high mountains between the 
Northern Areas (now part of the province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Xinjiang. It took 
twenty years to complete and is better known as Karakoram Highway (KKH).9 The 
road did not really connect to Baltistan, though. Before Partition, Skardu, the main 
town of Baltistan, was connected eastward by a pony trail to Kargil. As soon as the 
Indo-Pak conflict broke out, the Pakistani army was quick to construct jeepable roads 
and suspension bridges, but the main westward route at that time was a seasonally 
open jeep track connecting Gilgit to Skardu via the Deosai Plain, not the Indus river 
passage.10 It took a few more years before a gravel all-weather link road was extended 
from KKH to Skardu via the Indus route.11 However, communication continued to 
be vulnerable, due to severe geographical and climatic conditions, which caused 
roadblocks along the makeshift route.
Because of the border conflicts with Pakistan and China, India constructed a 
handful of airstrips in the border area that were strictly for military use. The runway 
outside Kargil town was built in 1959 and used for the Indian Air Force’s Douglas 
Dakota DC3 aircrafts. When the Sino-Indian war broke out in 1962 the runway was 
abandoned, after which operations were shifted to Leh.12 The Transit Halt of Indian 
Soldiers Enroute (THOISE) landing strip was located near the LoC in Shyok Valley, a 
part of the pre-Partition region of Baltistan that was captured from Pakistan in the 
1971 Indo-Pak war. It took until 1975 before the airport in Leh was opened to civilian 
traffic. At the time of writing, the airport in Kargil has only been reopened for Indian 
army traffic, predominantly its old AN32 twin engine Russian transport aircrafts 
bought in the 1970s.13 When the Sino-Indian border situation became stabilized 
several of the military airstrips in the region were abandoned and left defunct. They 
have only recently been brought back to life to revamp army support lines (the Daulet 
Beg Oldie, Fukche, and Nyoma airstrips). Today four airlines operate daily civil flights 
in and out of Leh (Air India, Jet, GoAir, and Vistara). Air India also operates limited 
flights to THOISE, where local civilian passengers are allowed on board (Singh 2009).
The recently introduced Indian UDAN-RCS scheme (Uṛe Deś kā Ām Nāgarik–
Regional Connectivity Scheme) to improve regional connectivity as part of the Indian 
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government’s National Civil Aviation Policy (NCAP) will resurrect and bring civil 
aviation to some of the old military runways lying across the region. In the second 
UDAN-RCS bidding round the airline Mehair Seaplane Services out of the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands was selected to operate a Czech-made LET 410-UV twin-engine 
nineteen-seater turboprop aircraft on a route between Srinagar-Kargil-Kishtwar-
Jammu starting from the summer of 2018. The military airstrips in Chushul and 
Fukche are on the UDAN-RCS scheme’s list of unserved airports but are located in 
northeastern Ladakh, which are not in the Baltistan region (see Airports Authority of 
India 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, n.d.).
When the Indo-Pak conflict escalated after Partition, the Dogra government in 
Skardu cleared a dirt landing strip in September-October 1947. On October 27 India 
took control of Skardu, and Dakotas were used to drop supplies into the city. They 
could not fly above the high-altitude mountains but had to navigate lower along 
the Indus Valley (Kumar 2007). The landing strip remained unused, although during 
those days a small so-called Harvard aircraft landed on a sandy plain on the outskirts 
of town that the pilot had mistakenly taken to be an airport.14 With the help of 
locals, the Harvard was able to take off again. After the siege of the Skardu garrison 
in 1947–48 the Indians surrendered and the area fell into the hands of Pakistan. On 
October 19, 1948 the Government of Pakistan hired three hundred porters to turn the 
landing strip into a proper 200-x-1,200-yard airstrip. It was completed by the end of 
November the same year. A British designed, twin-engine Bristol 170 PAF-freighter/
airliner flown by a certain Captain Ashgar was the first aircraft to land there on 
March 16, 1949.15
The Government of Pakistan authorized Orient Airways to operate Dakotas with 
supplies and passengers from Peshawar and Rawalpindi to Skardu as early as 1948.16 
The Dakotas were later replaced by the turboprop aircrafts Fokker F27 Friendship 
200 and Franco-Italian manufactured ATRs (1980s), Boeing 737 jets (late 1980s), and 
Airbus A320 jets (2015).17 Skardu Airport, or Quadri Air Force Base as it is also called, 
is located in a wide valley eighteen kilometers out of town. A civilian passenger 
lounge was not built there until the 1980s. Over the years the Skardu flight from 
Islamabad has had one of the highest cancellation ratios in the world, due to extreme 
weather conditions, technical and scheduling issues, and a lack of experienced pilots.
As the Northern Areas of Pakistan became more accessible, various projects were 
implemented mainly in the area of rural development under the custody of the 
Swiss-based Aga Khan Foundation (AKF).18 The AKF also provided basic educational 
and medical facilities for the area. The army, road, hydropower works, as well as 
AKF projects meant employment opportunities in the local labor market. Access 
to transport also provided a new opportunity structure in terms of employment, 
business, and education through migration to the cities of the south (Sökefeld 1999; 
Jensen 2007; Magnusson 2006).
At a point when the development in the area seemed to have stagnated in the 
2000s, Pakistan’s government struck a new deal with China. The two nation states 
had had formal diplomatic relations since 1951 and settled their border issue 
through an agreement signed already in 1963. Relations took a new turn in 2013 with 
the introduction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC consists 
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of a series of agreements between Pakistan and China regarding large Chinese 
investments, estimated to be around US$46 billion, in energy projects, railroads, 
highways, pipelines for gas and oil, and optical fiber networks as part of a new “Silk 
Road” with access to the Arabian Sea. The development of CPEC started in 2014; the 
developers plan to finish it by 2030. The investments are part of China’s current 
foreign policy, called the Belt and Road Initiative, to strengthen infrastructure and 
improve connectivity and transportation as a form of political leverage. With large-
scale investments like CPEC China seeks to expand its soft power by building bilateral 
relationships and bringing its allies closer (Cui 2018). In the case of Pakistan, CPEC 
is best understood as foreign aid in the form of technological and infrastructural 
knowledge and investments. For Gilgit-Baltistan, CPEC, the reconstruction of KKH, 
and construction of new hydropower facilities has meant the influx of thousands 
of Chinese workers and a large number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers 
to provide security for them. The non-participatory approach and lack of benefits 
for local communities has caused resentment and protests as well as animosity 
between the Chinese workers/soldiers and locals (Abid and Ahfaq 2015). In terms of 
development, Skardu and Ghanche seem to remain peripheral to the benefits of CPEC. 
“We are yet just smelling the so-called prospects and hazards [of CPEC]. There is no 
presence of any [PLA] army in Baltistan. So far only a few Chinese tourists can be seen in 
Skardu but not in Ghanche,” as one of my local informants summarized the situation.19
Even though the Balti and Ladakhi communities residing on the Indian side of the 
LoC have definitely been peripheral to the nation state, the Indian government has 
been more responsive to their demands for development resources than is the case 
in Pakistan. Protests against slow and inadequate development in the 1950s led to the 
creation of a special office for Ladakhi affairs and, eventually, a restructuring of the 
administration of the region. In the 1980s, the Indian government started to use the so- 
called Autonomous Hill Council or Autonomous District Council model to co-opt 
peripheral communities by letting them take part in the decision-making. On paper, 
the model decentralized much of the decision-making about the region to a council 
elected by a regional constituency. The council makes decisions about development 
policies and disposes a regional budget. Ladakh got its Hill Council status in 1995 
and Kargil in 2003. As Martijn van Beek comments, “the council has considerable 
freedom to formulate its own development plans, and therefore radically reconsider 
the overall direction and content of development in Ladakh” (1999, 441). A problem 
with the Hill Council solution has been, however, that local political conflicts or 
the “destructive logic of electoral politics” (ibid., 445) and cultural rights politics 
between local communities have, in practice, slowed down the development process 
and weakened national and state-level administration in Ladakh (ibid.; Bhan 2009).
Despite the fact that communal politics seem to have paralyzed part of the 
development process, various development projects are in progress across the 
region. Perhaps the most extensive of them has been the Watershed Development 
Program (WDP), a national program that was initiated in Ladakh in 1995. It was a 
rural development initiative focusing on irrigation, farming, and afforestation. A core 
idea was the involvement of local NGOs as “Project Implementing Agencies” (PIA), 
something that led to a “mushrooming of new NGOs in the region which hoped to 
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benefit from available money flows” (Nüsser, Schmidt, and Dame 2012, 8). As is noted 
by John S. Mankelow (2003, 51) in his study of the implementation of the WDP in 
Zangskar, starting an NGO and becoming a PIA offered a business opportunity for local 
entrepreneurs, and to stop the money from ending up in private pockets responsibility 
for the implementation was eventually taken back by Ladakh’s Hill Council.
Some of the more recent development projects in the region have been concerned 
with ecological issues, energy, water management, education, public health, and 
nutrition. They include the construction of a channel diverting the Indus River to 
irrigate barren land along the south side of the Indus Valley, the construction of 
hydropower stations (most recently in Alchi), the introduction of compact fluorescent 
lamps and solar power installations, the promotion of water harvesting constructions 
such as the ingenious artificial glaciers to reduce water scarcity, and small-scale 
water control solutions to reduce the damage of flash floods. After its introduction of 
Operation Sadbhavana in 1998 the Indian Army has also become an active partner in 
regional welfare and development (Gujja et al. 2003; Nüsser, Schmidt, and Dame 2012; 
Morup and Joshi 2003; Wiley 1997; and see also Tata Institute of Social Sciences n.d.; 
Indian Army n.d.).
Development and connectivity
Why do states build roads, railways, and airports, and worry so much about 
connectivity? In terms of internal colonization they are primarily means for the 
center to access the periphery to bring it under its control and administration 
(compare with Jonathan Demenge’s 2015 work on road construction and development 
in Ladakh). As Piers M. Blaikie, John Cameron, and David Seddon (1980, 176) have 
shown, the construction of roads in Nepal led to a large increase in government 
revenues by “customs and surcharge on imported vehicles, fuel, spare parts, sales tax, 
licensing and registration of vehicles, vehicle tax, route operation tax for passenger 
carriers, and tolls.” In the eyes of the state roads are also symbolic for state-building, 
as they bind the nation together. For instance, in the year 2000, the Indian Ministry 
of Rural Development launched its Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), 
a program with the ambitious target to build “good All-weather roads to all Rural 
Habitations with a population of more than 500 persons by the year 2007” (National 
Rural Infrastructure Development Agency 2004) including the Hill States.
A vague idea about the link between connectivity and development and nation-
making continues to dominate the master narratives about the need to connect the 
nation states’ peripheral regions to the center. A more recent example is the Indian 
Ministry of Civil Aviation’s UDAN-RCS scheme mentioned earlier in this article. 
It is part of the NCAP introduced in 2016 to improve regional connectivity in the 
country by “mak[ing] flying affordable to the masses,” as is stated in the scheme’s 
vision (Ministry of Civil Aviation, n.d.). It is a demand-driven, market-oriented 
program where airline operators are bidding for concessions to operate unserved 
or underserved airports or airstrips. In return they are subsidized through tax 
exemptions and by not having to pay any kind of landing charges. The first round 
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of bidding included 406 unserved airports or airstrips in the country, some of them 
along the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir, Kargil, and Ladakh.
Putting the internal colonization perspective aside for a moment, the two nation 
states’ rhetoric about infrastructural investments in their peripheries changed from 
the initial national security discourse to an economic growth discourse, linked to 
the work of influential development and Marxist economists in the 1950s, such as 
Gunnar Myrdal, P. A. Baran, Oskar Lange, Charles Bettleheim, and P. C. Mahalanobis, 
the main architect behind the Indian government’s second five-year plan (rapid 
industrialization!), and then moved on to a rural development and human well-
being discourse (compare with van Beek 1999; Magnusson 2011c; Demenge 2015). 
In the economic growth discourse modern infrastructure is a way to escape from 
“underdevelopment” by pulling all parts of the state into its economic machinery, 
while in the rural development and human well-being discourse infrastructure 
emphasizes access to modern services and empowerment (compare with Robertson 
1984 on “evolutionary functionalism”). What we see in the case of India and Pakistan 
is that the initial security discourse that left Baltistan and the local communities in 
the periphery has given way to an economic discourse such as the one on CPEC and a 
human development discourse such as the one on UDAN-RCS, where the communities 
are included and often the designated subjects.
Looking specifically at the way the governments of India and Pakistan motivate 
the development of information and communications technology (ICT) connectivity 
in their peripheries today, the economic growth and human well-being discourses 
have been merged in the sense that economic growth is stated as a necessary step for 
human well-being. For instance, the current vision of the Special Communications 
Organization (SCO), a public-sector organization working under the government of 
Pakistan’s Ministry of Information Technology (IT) to provide telecom services in 
Baltistan, is to “empower people through state-of-the-art information, communication 
and telecom services in the most difficult mountainous region of Pakistan” (Special 
Communications Organization n.d., emphasis added). The ambitious fiber optic cable 
project included in the CPEC agreements links the centers together, and according 
to a former prime minister of Pakistan it will also “facilitate trade, tourism and IT 
awareness in the region and generate economic opportunities particularly in Gilgit-
Baltistan” (see Dawn 2013).
Here, as in the case of other kinds of connectivity, the link between ICT and 
development is more complex in reality and often left unexplained when investigated 
closer. For instance, as long as there are people and places that are not connected, 
ICT actually increases inequality to make offline communities even more peripheral. 
Even if they become connected, there would still be a gap between those who can 
afford expensive technology and those who have to do with old and/or inexpensive 
gear and poor connections. There are centers and peripheries in ICT networks too, 
and empowerment does not automatically follow from being online (Unwin 2017).
In her review of research discourses, Chrisanthi Avgerou (2010) shows that the 
evidence supporting arguments of ICT-enabled development is rather weak. In many 
cases the transfer and diffusion of ICT in so-called developing countries is considered 
to be unproblematic, and the ways its social embeddedness may influence the impact 
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are not really investigated further. However, there are studies that try to find out 
more about how people make sense of and accommodate ICT in their lives. Some 
researchers have taken an interest in what they imagine to be a clash between ICT 
and certain “cultures.” Luckily, others have moved on to accept the idea of “culture” 
as an ongoing accomplishment. Looking closer at the transformative aspect of ICT the 
causality is often postulated, although some researchers have found that ICT can have 
unequal effects on different categories of people that may result in power struggles 
(ibid.). For instance, using an intersectionality approach to study the empowerment 
of Ugandan women by giving them mobile phones, Linda Paxling (2015) shows how 
the project had gender-sensitive transformative aspects. With a similar perspective 
on how age, gender, and diversity are represented, silenced, or prioritized in ICT 
design in Europe, Nelly Oudshoorn, Louis Neven, and Marcelle Stienstra (2016) 
demonstrate how the neglect of such aspects might result in social exclusion.
Returning to the subject of internal colonization and the Zomia lens, I want to 
make a distinction between “real connectivity” and “virtual connectivity.” Roads 
and airports are distance-demolishing technologies that overcome the friction of 
physical terrain by making the periphery reachable and accessible to the state and 
thereby possible to govern. What about virtual connectivity, however? Once roads, 
airports, and ICT are in place they do not only serve the rulers. They also provide 
opportunities for peripheral communities to access resources and places that were 
previously not available to them. In that sense the process of modern internal 
colonization can be quite a double-edged sword. More importantly, what separates 
physical connectivity from virtual connectivity is that ICT puts the periphery online 
with the rest of the world and thus lets its inhabitants move into a new, transnational 
terrain with its own friction, thereby letting people who choose to do so take refuge in 
virtual places out of the state’s reach. Of course, it is a very idealistic proposition that 
immediately raises questions about who controls the infrastructure of optical fibers 
and servers, the possibility to survey and filter traffic, and the power to shut users 
down. For various reasons that will become clearer through my discussion in the 
following paragraphs about Baltistan and the friction of virtual terrain, controlling 
the infrastructure might not be as easy as it seems.
International colonialism and jellyfish communities
As already argued, Baltistan became an object of internal colonialism after Partition. 
This was an experience it shared with many other peripheral communities living 
on the edge of the new postcolonial and independent nation states. It also involved 
absorption, displacement, and/or extermination of the previous inhabitants. As Scott 
notes, it
involved a botanical colonization in which the landscape was transformed—by 
deforestation, drainage, irrigation, and levees—to accommodate crops, settlement 
patterns, and system of administration familiar to the state and to the colonists. 
One way of appreciating the effect of this colonization is to view it as a massive 
reduction of vernaculars of all kinds: of vernacular languages, minority peoples, 
vernacular cultivation techniques, vernacular land tenure systems, vernacular 
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hunting, gathering, and forestry techniques, vernacular religion, and so on. The 
attempt to bring the periphery into line is read by representatives of the sponsor-
ing state as providing civilization and progress—where progress is, in turn, read as 
the intrusive propagation of the linguistic, agricultural, and religious practices of 
the dominant ethnic group. (2009, 12–13)
The nation states set out to mop up the areas that had been hard to rule because 
of their geographical inaccessibility. The task was to bring the communities living 
in these areas under administration, incorporate them into the national economy, 
and tax them. This was the “last enclosure” (ibid., 11) made possible through the use 
of the modern distance-demolishing technologies described in this article, such as 
air transport, the construction of bridges and roads such as the Karakoram Highway, 
and the construction of telecom networks. It was also a project of state- and nation-
making and the projection of a national identity, culture, language, and religion, 
perhaps best manifested in the establishment of a national educational system and 
national broadcasting of radio and television based on the practices and language of 
the dominant ethnic groups.
According to Scott (2009) hill societies like Baltistan are primarily characterized 
by two things. First, hills are “shatter zones” and “zones of refuge,” where the 
communities, to a large extent, are formed by people that want to escape from state-
making projects. It is a perspective that contradicts the idea of peripheral societies 
as undeveloped and primitive and in need of state-aided modern development and 
progress. Second, in hill societies ethnicity, culture, identity, history, and religion 
have a “jellyfish” capacity, meaning that they are fluid, flexible, hybrid, adaptable, 
and porous. They change as a strategic choice to manage state-making attempts and 
to keep the wannabe rulers at bay.
By invoking Scott’s “zone of refuge” concept, I do not suggest that Baltistan’s 
residents resisted incorporation into the modern nation states on all accounts. Indeed, 
the community did and does want its share of the state’s services and resources. In 
so doing, however, they resist being governed by the state and its nation-making 
projects, which are crafted and carried out by the dominant ethnic groups and their 
own master narratives. Baltistan is definitely a space of political resistance and 
cultural refusal, as Scott (2009, 20) would term it, and thus a place where people try to 
avoid the internal colonizer’s state-making efforts. Much of the current local tension 
in the region has been the result of the large influx of state administrators and armed 
forces that bring their political, cultural, and religious claims of superiority. By 
talking about Baltistan as a zone of refuge, then, I do not mean that the community 
wants to be left behind or left out in terms of progress and development. At the same 
time, it does want to escape from state-making projects. It is from this perspective of 
resistance that we should investigate the subaltern’s ability to jellyfish its traditions.
When distance-demolishing technologies overcame the friction of terrain, 
the high mountains were no longer enough to protect Baltistan from internal 
colonization. As the weaker party in relationship to the states the community had 
to find other ingenious means of resistance. In a previous work Scott (1990, 19, 157) 
asserts that subordinate groups develop a subtle low-profile resistance by voicing 
their alternative discourse in cultural expressions that lend themselves to a double 
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reading, with one reading being innocuous and, if necessary, providing an avenue 
of retreat. It has a hidden transcript that challenges the discourses of the colonizer. 
This is the case, for example, with the Balti pop-ghazals that I will discuss in more 
detail in the following paragraphs. Another strategy of the weak that has been noted 
by Richard Tapper (1990, 66–67) in his studies of state formation among Middle 
Eastern tribes is to maintain a “diffuse form of organization” (ibid., 67). The idea is 
to maintain a repertoire of alternative political institutions and ideologies “by which 
they can adapt to conditions of autonomy as well as to the . . . aggressive policies of 
outsiders” (ibid.). Being socially, economically, and politically disorganized by choice 
is a strategy. It is not because they were less civilized or less developed in the past, as 
is the common narrative propagated by the colonizers.
Jellyfish Baltistan
It was often the acephalous character of the frontier communities that frustrated 
British rule during the heyday of the empire. The British were used to having a clear 
counterpart to deal with and were confused when they encountered numerous fluid 
communities whose relationships and politics seemed to be rather non-hierarchical 
and constantly changing their shape. As Malcolm Yapp concludes in his study of 
how the British failed to control tribes and states in the Khyber region in the late 
1830s and early 1840s, “Like the jellyfish, the absence of a backbone to be broken 
was the greatest defense of the tribes against the waves of state power that beat 
upon them” (1983, 186). It is precisely this jellyfish factor that Scott (2009) takes 
further by treating it as a strategic choice. In his reading of the concept, it allows for 
freedom in maneuvering not only in the political relationship to rulers but also in 
the construction of ethnicity, identity, culture, history, and religion. In a community 
where history and culture are only oral and vernacular it is possible to forget and 
remember the past selectively, for there is no single, written authoritative history or 
genealogy. In a zone of refuge, moreover, there is no dominant ethnicity or identity 
but a mix, something that allows the community to express and enact itself from a 
repertoire of strategically appropriate identities (ibid., 229–30).
How does the jellyfish strategy work in modern South Asian nation states? 
Peripheral communities like the Balti cannot escape completely from them. In 
fact, there are a number of good reasons for these communities to entertain a 
relationship with the state and thus choose a more sophisticated strategy than 
being merely acephalous. Cherishing their peripherality, these communities still 
want access to modern services, funds, and the various development programs a 
modern state can provide. So how do they maneuver vis-à-vis the state to be able 
to make legitimate claims on state-controlled benefits such as economic resources, 
opportunities for education and employment, as well as to politically influence 
and negotiate successfully the allocation of these benefits? It is a situation that 
creates a double-sidedness where the community pragmatically makes do with the 
ambiguity of not wanting to be governed by the state but at the same time wanting 
to share its benefits. It is a perspective that allows a bit more agency to be ascribed 
to the objects of colonialism than the categorization thesis put forward by Benedict 
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Anderson and others. Peripheral communities are not just victims of colonization but 
can be strategical agents in their use of state-institutionalized forms of communal 
identification, even down to an individual level (van Beek 1997, 21).
A very clear example of this double-sidedness is the tribalization of the people of 
Ladakh and Kargil after independence, and especially the events from the late 1960s 
up until the early 2000s. Ladakh and Kargil are two adjoining areas in the western 
Himalayas bordering Pakistan and Tibet. The total population is around 275,000 with 
roughly a 50/50 balance between the areas. After Partition, Ladakh and Kargil became 
part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. As mentioned earlier, the areas were 
later recognized as autonomous districts. In this process they became so-called hill-
tribes by the power rested in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The whole 
idea of autonomous districts was, as already indicated, a state strategy intended to 
incorporate peripheral communities into the post-Independence Indian nation state. 
After a long period of agitation, sometimes violent, during the 1980s, Ladakh finally 
received its hill-tribe status in 1995, while Kargil had to wait until 2003 (Stuligross 
1999; Sonntag 2004).
According to the Indian Constitution, Article 46, so-called “scheduled tribes” are 
protected by legislation and eligible for various state-sponsored schemes, programs, 
and other benefits. The implementation of the article led to a kind of race for 
tribalization between peripheral communities. In the case of Ladakh and Kargil it has 
been thoroughly researched by the Dutch sociologist Martijn van Beek (1995, 1997, 
2001) who had the opportunity to witness the events at first hand. The agitations for 
regional autonomy and scheduled tribe status seem to have started in the late 1960s. 
In 1980 an “All Ladakh Action Committee for Declaring Ladakh a Scheduled Tribe” 
(LAC) was formed to negotiate with the Indian government. The argument I want to 
make here is, of course, that it is Article 46 that motivated LAC to jellyfish what was 
commonly referred to as “Ladakhis” into a number of ethnic tribes, and that these 
tribes were invented, not really existing in an essential way.
A few years into the 1980s a group of Ladakhi political leaders came up with a 
list of ten tribes that they submitted to the Indian government. The government 
responded by conducting a “mini-census,” sending out eighteen jeep loads of social 
scientists to tour the countryside in order to find evidence of valid grounds for the 
suggested tribes. As a result, eight of the tribes on the list were declared to have the 
qualifications of a scheduled tribe.20 A community that did not make the cut but that 
was on the original list was the Argons (mainly represented in the Kargil area). It was 
found to be too unstable for scheduled tribe status (any person of mixed Buddhist 
and Muslim descent can belong to it). It was therefore suggested by the government 
that people who identified themselves as Argons should instead register as Bots, the 
largest recognized scheduled tribe category in Ladakh (van Beek 1997, 21–41).
The story of the “tribes” of Ladakh, farcical as it may seem, serves to prove my 
point. The communities living in Ladakh and Kargil strategically jellyfished as tribes 
in order to fit the Article 46 framework provided by the state, and the jeep teams 
seem to have bought it. There is no ethnic base for these tribes; they are primarily 
constructed as administrative categories that effectively incorporate people in the 
periphery of the nation state as citizens, but at the same time the scheduled tribe 
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status allows them to make legitimate claims on autonomy and to contest with other 
scheduled Indian tribes over affirmative action and special state-sponsored benefits.
Jellyfishing the history of Baltistan
Jellyfish histories of Baltistan are brought to the fore in the way they are represented 
by learned local authorities and cultural and political Balti activists. Academic 
researchers are involved as well. Just like Scott predicts, their versions drift apart, 
diverge, and lack a clear point of reference in written, authoritative texts. They 
tend to accumulate previous interpretations to reflect current interests and power 
relations at the time of telling and writing (compare with Scott 2009, 230–31).
The vernacular history of Baltistan has been passed down from generation to 
generation. One of its present custodians is the well-respected Sadiq Ali Sadiq, an 
elderly resident of Kargil’s Balti Bazaar. In recent years it has also appeared in the 
shape of self-combined bits and pieces picked up here and there by activists within 
the Baltistan Movement.
The people who have been writing academically about the history of Baltistan 
are outsiders to the community, foreigners like myself, in some instances actually 
employees of the state. Reviewing material that is academic or claims to be academic 
research, I find it to be characterized by two things. First, when it comes to the early 
history of the region, there are very few sources upon which to draw. In the sources 
that are available, for example those used in the works of Christopher Beckwith 
(1987) and Helmut Hoffman (1990), respectively, the region of Baltistan is considered 
very peripheral. Second, researchers largely disagree about events in Baltistan from 
about the first century ce up until today. Much of the debate concerns the dating of 
when Tibetans ruled Baltistan and when the community was converted to Islam.
According to vernacular history, what was to become Baltistan was originally 
the place of the Mons, who were later replaced by the Dards. This came to an end 
around 300 bce when a Mongol king by the name of Nyi Thistan attacked Ladakh 
and took control of the southern part of the area that was to be Purig (Rizvi 1993, 
10–11). Beckwith and Hoffman, on the one hand, date a Tibetan occupation of the 
area to roughly the seventh and eighth centuries. This was the period when the 
Tibetan u-chen script and Buddhist doctrine were introduced in the community, 
they conclude. Ahmad Hasan Dani (2001), on the other hand, argues that there was 
a previous period of Buddhist influence in the first century that spread to Baltistan 
from Gilgit or Kashmir. Of course, there are no good sources to prove any of this. 
They are fair guesses by proxy. According to Dani (2001, 232), the Tibetan period 
ended in the thirteenth century when Amir-i-Kabir Sayyid Ali Hammadani arrived in 
Baltistan. Allegedly, he was accompanied by a group of supporters with an intent to 
convert the local population (Rizvi 1993, 71). On the contrary, Banat Gul Afridi (1988, 
26–27), quoting Hashmatullah Khan Lakhnavi’s Tārīkh-i Jammun (published in 1939), 
states that Amir-i-Kabir Sayyid Ali Hammadani never went to Baltistan. Instead it 
was his nephew, Mohammad Nurubaksh, that converted the community to Islam. 
Hashmatullah Khan Lakhnavi’s work is considered the most authoritative Urdu 
source, and local historians often quote it. However, Hashmatullah Khan Lakhnavi 
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was not an academic researcher. He was an administrative officer in the service of the 
Jammu and Kashmir government when it was still a princely state.
Lakhnavi collected written texts as well as oral narratives for his book. The section 
on Baltistan has been translated into English and published in Pakistan (Bray 2013), 
but Andreas Rieck (1995), for instance, does not accept its authority. He proposes that 
Mohammad Nurubaksh never went to Baltistan. Instead he calls on a Sufi narrative of 
history to argue that the person who brought Islam and Shi’ism to Baltistan was, in 
fact, an Iraqi preacher by the name of Mir Shams al-Din who escaped to the region in 
the fifteenth century. In the foreword to Rizvi (1993), Ahmet Yurur puts Mir Shams-
al-Din and the conversion in the seventeenth century. Rizvi himself, however, still 
adheres to the fifteenth-century date in the rest of the book (ibid., 72). Sridhar Kaul 
and H. N. Kaul (2004, 120) claim that Shams-al-Din came from Khorasan in Persia 
in the sixteenth century. In another of his publications, Dani (1997, 225) credits 
two Shi’ite missionary brothers from Persia with the conversion, Mawlana Sayyid 
Mahmud Shah Tusi and Mir Sayyid Ali Tusi, traveling from Yarkand in the sixteenth 
century. The German missionary of the Moravian church in Ladakh and one of the 
classic Tibetologists August Hermann Francke approaches the issue a bit differently 
by looking at when local Balti rulers started to include Muslim names in their 
pedigrees. In this way he dates Muslim influence to the fourteenth century when 
the name Sultan Sikender enters the list (1907, 90). Wolfgang Holzwarth (1998, 302) 
quotes Firishtra’s (aka Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah) Tārīkh-i Firishta to propose that 
the first Muslim ruler in Baltistan was Ali Ray who got there in the fifteenth century.
There are reasons to be skeptical concerning Holzwarth’s assumption, since 
Tārīkh-i Firishta was written on commission from Ibrahim Shah II, king of the 
Sultanate of Bijapur (now in Karnataka) around the turn of the seventeenth century 
to renew the Indian historical narrative after the Muslim conquest. Firishtra was 
from a Persian family and grew up in what is now Punjab in Pakistan. Before Ibrahim 
Shah II entrusted him with history writing, he had made his way up the ranks of a 
military career. The British historian Peter Jackson (1999, 50–51, 151) points out that 
Tārīkh-i Firishtra is a secondary source, quite similar to Tārīkh-i Jammun and Godfrey 
T. Vigne’s Travels in Kashmir, Ladak, Iskardo, the Countries Adjoining the Mountain-Course 
of the Indus and the Himalaya North of the Panjab (see the following paragraphs) in its 
random collection of material and reliance on hearsay and legends, which sometimes 
even included imaginative interpretations. In other words, they were compendia 
of folklore, not necessarily accurately researched histories utilizing objective data 
culled from manuscripts, inscriptions, and so on.
Scott would probably take this disagreement between historians to prove his 
point in more than one way. First, we can see how the history of Baltistan has been 
rewritten, probably not as much by the academics as in their sources, depending on 
purpose and interest at the time. It is rather obvious how the genealogy of Muslim 
rulers/converters in Baltistan, such as the Maqpon dynasty, has been assembled over 
time to be better situated in current situations. This suggests how legend is often not 
clearly separated from facts. Some of the classical sources on which a good part of the 
research depends are, when scrutinized closely, rather questionable. For instance, a 
classic source that has been used by researchers is Vigne’s aforementioned Travels in 
74 | Asian Ethnology 80/1 • 2021
Kashmir, Ladak, Iskardo (1842). Vigne was not a historian but a British barrister, cricket 
player, and travel writer. In the mid-1830s he traveled extensively in the region, 
randomly collecting all kinds of material for his book. The problem, though, is that he 
employed very little source and fact checking.
The second point is that Scott would probably point out that the Muslim rulers 
mentioned in earlier paragraphs were not actually rulers but more likely persons using 
Baltistan as a zone of refuge and using the friction of terrain to escape from valley 
rulers. This is hinted at both by Holzwarth (1998) and Rieck (1995), when they discuss 
Baltistan as a place for Nurubakshi leaders to hide out at a time when followers of 
that school were being persecuted. In vernacular history, the founder of the Maqpon 
dynasty of rulers in Skardu came from Kashmir, perhaps as another refugee from the 
valley? Pascale Dolfus (1995) suggests the idea that it was not “rulers” or “leaders” 
that came to the area but Muslim traders securing their trade routes. If we look back 
on the situation before the advent of modern distance-demolishing technologies 
we are thus more likely to find that the friction of terrain meant that ruling from a 
distant state center was an impossible task in practice.
Third, Scott would probably question whether or not the Balti community was 
converted after all. He would suggest that it was more likely that the people of 
Baltistan jellyfished ruling attempts by appearing as Muslims in public when they felt 
it was appropriate to ward off or please the new rulers to be. This view is supported 
by the works of Nicola Grist (1995), Smriti Srinivas (1995), and Rieck (1995), who all 
point out that there was no institutionalized religion in the region until perhaps the 
(late) nineteenth century. Once again, according to vernacular history, people would 
indeed project themselves differently depending on the existential situation. Religion 
was just a “thin layer over a plethora of pre-Islamic beliefs and superstitions” (Rieck 
1995, 165). Besides this, the “religion and sword thesis” adapted by some researchers 
must be critically questioned, as Muslim conquest and rule does not automatically 
lead to the conversion of the subdued to the Islamic faith (Eaton 1993, 113).
Moving on to the bric-a-brac historical narrative presented by the Baltistan 
Movement, activists there make clear differences in strategic maneuvering, 
depending on current agendas and to what extent it is necessary for the activists to 
jellyfish it. During one of my periods of fieldwork in Ladakh, I met up with an activist 
from Skarchen. Just like Franke, he produced a list of names of rulers, but with a 
somewhat more aggressive interpretation. On the list were the names of rulers from 
1190–1915 ce. Contrary to both Francke and the other mentioned researchers, the first 
Muslim name on his list was Ibrahim Shah in the thirteenth century. Ibrahim Shah, 
he explained, was the founder of the Maqpon dynasty that ruled Baltistan for twenty-
four consecutive generations. The start of the dynasty, he continued, was the end 
of an authentic lineage of Balti kings, and the Maqpons were in fact representatives 
of a foreign political force of oppressors that, over the years, eroded and “muffled” 
the true culture of Baltistan. This is a narrative that puts the Golden Age of Baltistan 
in the Tibetan period before the arrival of Muslims in the area. It does not really 
distinguish between being independent or under Tibetan rule but primarily serves to 
represent the culture of Baltistan as Tibetan and the Balti people as ethnic Tibetans.
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According to another activist in a different part of Baltistan, Tibetans had never 
ruled the region. The people of Baltistan, he argued somewhat self-contradictorily, 
were originally Dards, but a massive migration of Tibetans “more than a thousand 
years ago overwhelmed the culture of the Dards and mopped up their racial 
character.” In his narrative, then, the Tibetans were the oppressors, with the Dards as 
the authentic inhabitants of Baltistan.
Although they are both activists in the Baltistan Movement, their narratives are 
quite different. But why? It is most likely because the latter version works better 
with the idea of a “Greater Ladakh,” a separatist concept that started to appear in 
the 2000s. In its most extensive version Greater Ladakh includes, from west to east, 
Chitral in the northwestern corner of Pakistan, Gilgit, Azad Kashmir, Baltistan, 
Kashmir, Kargil, Zanskar, Nubra, Ladakh, Chang Tang, Lahaul, and Spiti. As is obvious, 
the Balti community is not the only community included as being a part of this 
imagined geopolitical entity, the Dards in its western parts being just one of them.
In fact, the imagined border of Greater Ladakh roughly resembles the historical 
border of Ladakh Wazarat, an administrative domain in the Dogra-ruled princely 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. This state was established after the Anglo-Sikh wars 
in the middle of the nineteenth century and the Ladakh Wazarat domain in 1901. It 
is thus a construct from the time of British colonial rule that disentangles Baltistan 
from the Golden Age of the Tibetan empire and Central Asia in order to dock it in 
a modern, colonial South Asian geography and history. This is obviously a whole 
different entity and with a different agenda on most accounts. It does not turn back 
to pre-Islamic history, only to the situation before Independence, Partition, and the 
making of the two new nation states.
As we have seen, different bits and pieces of the various historical narratives are 
floating about with “facts” being used liberally. They are assembled and reassembled 
by the narrators to serve their own purposes. As is evident from the preceding 
discussion, the history can be both ancient and recent. Its golden age can be set in 
the era of the Tibetan empire or in the modern colonial, pre-Independence era. It can 
be Buddhist and Muslim, Tibetan and South Asian. Some of it is oral and some of it 
is written and even academic. The written sources are used as references in the oral 
versions presented by the Balti activists while a good portion of the academic versions 
actually rely on old, questionable, and unverified oral sources. Taken together, these 
narratives provide the jellyfish “history of Baltistan” with its fluid, flexible, hybrid, 
adaptable, and porous shape, as in the case of the activists’ invention of a new history 
fit for the Greater Ladakh project.
Post-literate Baltistan?
As part of the revival of Balti culture there have been a number of contested initiatives 
to reintroduce a Balti script. In the community’s narrative it is said that the script 
fell gradually out of use under the Muslim influence and was replaced by the Perso-
Arabian script nasta‘līq that is used for Urdu. Because of the LoC, this is more valid for 
the Pakistani part of Baltistan today. In India, where Baltistan overlaps with Ladakh, 
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the u-chen script is used everywhere. As we shall see, though, its use by Balti speakers 
has also run into problems.
It is said in the Pakistani part of Baltistan that just up until recently u-chen 
was preserved by only a few elderly custodians, such as the well-known cultural 
personality Abbas Kazimir in Skardu. When the Baltistan Movement started to gain 
momentum some local activists in the town began to arrange free classes in u-chen. 
Still, there is not much more proof that u-chen is a Balti script other than the oral 
tradition and that rock carvings in Tibetan script are to be found in some places in 
Baltistan, such as in Bodhi Shagharan (the Buddhist polo ground) above the fort in 
Shigar Valley. When the community is learning u-chen today, it is primarily based 
on an association between the vernacular language, an archaic form of a western 
Tibetan dialect related to Purig and Ladakhi, and that u-chen suits its phonetics.
The story of the disappearance of Balti script is related to the version of Balti 
history that presents the pre-Muslim Tibetan period as the Golden Age of Baltistan. 
When Muslims began to rule in Baltistan they appropriated the written language, 
the narrative holds. But what if the community went vernacular and post-literate by 
choice in order to protect its language from being replaced by Urdu, the language 
of the rulers? Although the state can condition education and employment by 
only using the scripts of national languages, vernacular tradition can survive and 
continue, even thrive. If this is true, the current revival of a Balti script could actually 
be a counterproductive strategy and reopen the appropriation of Balti language. As 
we shall see, the production of Balti texts in u-chen has unavoidably led to trouble for 
its instigators.
A typical example of the appropriation of language is a schoolbook project that 
was launched by the Baltistan Cultural Federation (BCF, now BCDF), an NGO formed 
in Skardu in 1998. After Independence, Urdu, written in nasta‘līq script, became a 
national language and, along with English, the medium in schools, courts, offices, 
media, and administration. Even though the right to preserve, promote, and teach 
(without prejudice) “provincial languages” is protected in Pakistan’s Constitution, 
this has not been the case in practice.21
During the first four years of existence, under Abbas Kazimir’s leadership, the BCF 
decided to try and revive Balti script by printing one thousand textbooks in u-chen 
to be used in elementary schools. When word got out about the project, local Muslim 
leaders began to campaign against u-chen as an un-Islamic script, and they went on 
to print an alternative, competing textbook in which Balti was transliterated into 
nasta‘līq. Ultimately the competing book was officially chosen for teaching, and the 
BCF books never reached the schools (Magnusson 2011a). Another similar BCF project 
during this time was to put up sponsored store signs in u-chen, mainly in Skardu’s 
New Bazaar. The project was met with some success in the sense that the signs stayed 
up despite criticism, but as a shopkeeper pragmatically remarked to me, the primary 
reason was probably to save the cost of having to have them repainted.
More recently, a number of Balti scholars and social activists once again attempted 
to revamp the u-chen literacy project, or yige as the script was now called in the 
community. As part of this project a group of local teachers were trained to read and 
write in yige. Within the framework of BCDF a yige primer app was developed and can 
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be downloaded from APKPure.com.22 It is based on a phonetic spelling system and 
easy to use even for children. The project was met with the same kind of resistance as 
the BCF’s schoolbook project.
Vernacular Balti, when written down in u-chen/yige, has become an object of 
contention and appropriation not only in relation to the nation states but also in 
relation to other neighboring communities. For instance, the Kargil activists limit 
the concept of Greater Ladakh to Tibetan speakers, thus defining its borders more 
narrowly to include only Baltistan and Ladakh. What is interesting in this case is how 
Ladakhi nationalists sit uneasy with this and how Balti activists end up in a position 
where they accuse Ladakhis of kidnapping u-chen from other Tibetan speakers in the 
region (compare Gupta 2013b, 44–47). It is not only connected to the tribalization 
issue discussed in this article but also has historical roots that go back to the time of 
the Dogra rulers. During that time the rulers officially replaced u-chen with nasta‘līq. 
After Independence and Partition u-chen became an important symbol in the rise of 
Ladakhi nationalism. In the early 1950s, the Ladakhi political leader and member 
of Jammu and Kashmir’s assembly, Kusho Bakula, started lobbying for Tibetan to 
become the official language of Ladakh, calling it bodhic, bodik, or bod-yig and linking 
u-chen exclusively to Buddhism and Buddhist culture. This claim has remained at 
the core of Ladakhi nationalism during the cultural revival of the 1970s, the violent 
conflicts of the 1980s, and it continues today (Aggarwal 2004).
What is the advantage of the spoken word over the written word for a post-literate 
community that wants to avoid being governed? In one of his earlier books, Scott 
(1999) talks about public and hidden transcripts. The strategy of the oppressed 
community is to lend an innocuous quality to its cultural expressions. There is a 
hidden, backstage meaning that is only available to members of the community, and 
a public and more harmless meaning that can be referred to if the rulers question it.
In my previous work on Baltistan, I have used this approach to analyze the Balti 
pop-ghazal phenomenon (Magnusson 2011b). It is sung in Tibetan, but it is a mix of 
a Persian form of poetry and an Indian/Pakistani form of pop music. The ghazal has 
its roots in seventh-century Arabic verse and came to dominate Persian literature in 
Muslim parts of South and Central Asia by the thirteenth century. In the eighteenth 
century, Urdu ghazals had become very popular in India. The ghazal had its own 
distinctive character as a genre, but the basic form was still present (Manuel 1988–89, 
1993). In South Asia today, there is a distinction between light classical ghazals and 
pop-ghazals. The former is based on improvisation and elaboration in a public poetry 
recital, a so-called mushā´ira (Qureshi 1969), while the latter is performed as the vocal 
part in a modern band (Manuel 1988–89). Ghazals have often been used in Bollywood 
movies as soundtracks to romantic interaction between the main characters 
(Skillman 1986; Manuel 1988–89; Qureshi 1969, 1990). Pop-ghazal is one of the major 
formats of music recording in South Asia. It is a simplified version of the classical 
ghazal without space for elaboration or improvisation (Manuel 1993, 106).
When pop-ghazals with Balti lyrics were released they became very popular in the 
community. They were recorded on cassettes, CDs, VCDs, and DVDs. Many of them 
also became available on websites such as YouTube. Looking closer at the production 
of Balti pop-ghazals, much of the material comes from a joint venture between KASCO 
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and Skarchen, two pro-Balti NGOs on the Indian side. Together, the organizations 
have three business subsidiaries that hold the rights to the music: Universal Balti 
Music Zone, Kargil Vision, and Sarwar Cassette House Kargil.
One of the most prolific composers of Balti pop-ghazals is Riyaz Munshi from Kargil. 
His ghazals are produced in the Hindi pop-music style. The first album Niyamtsar (a 
Balti name for a friend you grow up with and then marry) was released in 2003. It 
was followed by Rgazoom (Admiring the Beauty), Zoom (Zoom), Sning Tam (Speak from 
the Heart), Chakbu (Bunch of Flowers), and Strogi Totee (Pigeon of Life). The albums 
were available on both sides of the LoC, and in 2006 Riyaz Munshi released an album 
with lyrics written by the Skardu poet Hassan Hasni (Tsarang Hasni’s Special). Hai-
Lay Hrgamo (Hey Joy) was released on VCD in 2004. It features music videos telling 
small stories in a Bollywood format. For instance, Rjait Pa Mait Yang (I Can’t Forget) 
alternates lines between a Balti romantic couple against the backdrop of a pastoral 
high Himalayan landscape with the singer, standing by a jeep, eventually surrounded 
by happy Buddhist monks. The vocal is sung in Balti and the lyrics have a conventional 
romantic content:
I have not forgotten you. I swear by God, I can’t forget you. If you can’t look at 
me in a loving way, at least dare to look at me with hatred. I have not forgotten 
the moment when we apologized to each other, touching chins. I wish you could 
remember those moments before the fortnight moon. Alas! I do not forget that 
moment of promises and pledges.
The DVD Sning I Shokboo (Written in the Heart) was released in 2007, and it includes 
Bollywood-style dance choreography. The video to the song Shoksi lay Rgamo (Hey 
You, Come Here) tells the story of the spirit of a Balti woman who has been killed in 
a car accident. The spirit appears in front of a man who has stopped his SUV by the 
roadside to rest for a while. Its content is romantic in the sense that it is intended to 
illustrate a Balti saying that the spirit of a person who dies with desire in his or her 
heart must roam the earth.
Even if the videos include clear elements of public education about Balti folklore 
such as dress and customs, the hidden transcript is found in the choice of language 
and in the intangible Balti spirit that is conveyed by the material. There is a sense 
of shared meaning and belonging only offered to members of the community. But 
what is really clever about this strategy is the separation of form from content that 
gives the pop-ghazal its dual reading. The conventional ghazal consists of Perso-
Arabic, Muslim love poetry, but when sung in Tibetan it conveys a deeper, hidden 
message of an independent Balti culture that is only fully perceivable to members of 
the community. Should outsiders ever challenge the ghazal’s deeper meaning as an 
anti-state or un-Islamic expression, the allegation could be rebuked with reference 
to the fact that the genre is an artistic form that belongs to and is even an important 
part of the ruler’s culture. By incorporating elements from the master culture as just 
described, the minority community jellyfishes its own traditions.23 An ironic twist is 
perhaps that Munshi’s first albums were subsidized by Indian government grants, as 
both KASCO and Skarchen are funded as PIAs (Project Implementation Agencies) in 
the Indian Watershed Development Project.
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The friction of virtual terrain
The Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian conflicts during the years following Partition and the 
large-scale military presence along the border region led to a rapid construction 
of military communication lines. The development of civilian connectivity, 
however, followed at a slower pace. At the time of Partition, Baltistan in Pakistan 
had a single telegraph connection located at the Sub-Post Office in Skardu. By 
the late 1960s a telephone exchange with fifty lines had been established (Afridi 
1988, 306). In the following three decades the exchange in Skardu continued to be 
the main telecommunication node on this side of the border. Some private users 
owned microwave satellite phones. When cordless phones became available in the 
market people started using the handsets more or less as local mobile phones, as 
the transmitters were designed to be powerful enough to give an extended reach 
over quite a distance from the base station. On the Indian side, Kargil was linked 
to a computer communication network in 1988–89, when a Network Informatics 
Centre District Unit was opened in town. In the mid-2000s mobile phone services 
were introduced on both sides of the border, using technology that prevented the 
networks from spilling over the border and only allowing postpaid subscriptions.
When broadband connectivity put the Balti community online in the 2000s 
there was a rapid increase of cross-border community interaction. Global, almost 
unrestricted internet access for private users provided a new platform for Balti revival 
and content, such as Riyaz Munshi’s pop-ghazals. To connect private subscribers, the 
internet service providers (ISPs) used a technology called ADSL (Asymmetric Digital 
Subscriber Line), where the signal is carried by the old telephone lines already in 
place, allowing up to 8Mbps download speed.
Satellite internet connectivity for private subscribers in Kargil was introduced in 
2001. Two years later an optical fiber connection (OFC) was ready for commercial use. 
Until 2012 the only ISP was Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), a government-
owned private company, which was started to take over telecommunication services 
from the Government Department(s) of Telecom Services and Telecom Operations. 
Business was then opened up for the private ISP Airtel. In the more rural parts of the 
region, BSNL provides a kind of mobile USB dongle broadband access service up to 
7Mbps called WiMax.
On the Pakistani side, Baltistan came online in 2004. At that point all internet traffic 
was routed through an SCO-exchange (Special Communications Organization) run by 
the army. In the beginning the public ISP was a private company called Comsats. But 
it was closed in 2007 and SCO is now the only ISP in the area. Baltistan is connected 
to the internet by an OFC from Gilgit and by satellite. Most of the private subscribers 
continue to use ADSL.
Both BSNL and SCO enforce censorship of content and, as we will see, traffic 
surveillance, phone tapping, and filtering. Nevertheless, there is plenty of Balti online 
activity of both a cultural and political nature. For instance, a search for “Baltistan” 
on YouTube will return around two hundred thousand hits. Comparing the online 
activity on both sides of the LoC, there are very few restrictions affecting Balti 
users in India. In Pakistan the thumbscrews are on, but, even so, pro-Balti content 
is readily accessible. Cases from my own research include the Skardu-based Balti 
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journalist Manzoor Parwana from Rondu Valley in Pakistan. Parwana is a pro-Balti 
anti-government political activist demanding independence from Pakistan. He has 
been persecuted, arrested, and jailed on several occasions for that. In 2009 he ran for 
a seat in the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly but did not get enough votes to win. 
During the campaign he started a Facebook page and later also a blog and a Twitter 
account. In April 2018 he had 4,899 Facebook friends (around nine hundred of them 
living in Baltistan) and was a member of 357 Facebook groups. He is mainly using 
these platforms as a “digital pulpit” in the political debate concerning Baltistan. He 
also uses it as a media broker of news and editorials about Baltistan (Magnusson 2016, 
103–5). Another case includes the Balti activist Senge Hasnan Sering who uses social 
media to share pro-Balti political material. He was one of the activists who taught 
the previously mentioned Tibetan script classes in Skardu, but he left Pakistan to 
escape the negative attention the Balti revival was attracting. From a new base in 
the United States, he started to participate in various events to voice his pro-Balti 
political agenda. In 2010 he started a Facebook page and also maintains a Twitter 
account. Approximately 25 percent of his Facebook friends were living in Baltistan 
by April 2018 (ibid., 101–3). One also finds a type of “small-scale” Balti activist on 
social media. They are the large number of ordinary, individual users who, unlike 
Sering and Parwana, are unknown in the community. The small-scale-acts people can 
be very prolific in posting photographs, YouTube clips, chatting, and so on. Taken 
together, the mass of this content and activity provides a kind of virtual Baltistan 
that transgresses the LoC division of the community and that is protected by a new 
kind of digital friction of terrain.
We might ask why this virtual terrain is so hard to rule when it is, in itself, a 
part of the state’s distance-demolishing technology? Why, as owners and providers 
of the OFC, cannot the state be in total control of all gateways, servers, and private 
accounts? Why is it not blocking access to foreign websites and IP addresses with pro-
Balti and anti-state content? Why does it not remove content and shut down domestic 
accounts? Let me try to address these questions in the following paragraphs.
It is not as if India and Pakistan are not trying. In fact, it is quite the opposite. 
Compared to, for example, western European countries, the so-called freedom of the 
net is lesser in India and especially in Pakistan when it comes to obstacles to access, 
limits on content, violation of user rights, and surveillance. While Germany scores 
20 on Freedom House’s “freedom of the net” score (1–100, the lesser the score, the 
freer), India scores 41 and Pakistan 71. For one thing, Freedom House puts internet 
penetration in Pakistan at just over 15.5 percent. It is obviously the peripheral and 
remote areas that make up the majority of the impenetrable portion.
Looking at restrictions on connectivity in Pakistan, internet services are 
frequently shut down during religious and national holidays. They are also shut 
down occasionally to prevent the spread of information when incidents occur in 
conflict-ridden areas. If we look at Pakistan’s track record over the past few years, 
both ICT users and bloggers have been arrested. Individual web and IP addresses have 
been shut down after so called blocking-orders on the grounds that the content is 
blasphemous, immoral, or damaging to the state and its representatives. This more 
or less covers just about every kind of content, if interpreted in a partisan way. 
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State control over ICT has been legislated in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and 
more recently in the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA). Censorship, 
filtering technologies, and data-collecting spyware such as FinFisher are commonly 
used by state authorities.24 Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter Service Intelligence 
(ISI), even has a mandate to take preemptive actions against cybercrimes, although 
there are, at least in theory, requirements of transparency and accountability when 
action is taken. Despite the rules, private users do have access to international news 
websites and the websites of various domestic political groups. Neither social media 
nor communication apps were blocked in 2017 (Freedom House 2017a).
Just like in Pakistan, India has the necessary legal instruments in place to restrict, 
block, and survey internet content and users.25 In comparison with its neighbor 
there is not the same level of government control exercised over the internet 
infrastructure and access to international gateways. There are several programs on 
the way to increase internet penetration, though, such as the Digital India Program 
launched in 2018 (http://digitalindia.gov.in/). According to Freedom House, the 
government does not routinely practice blocking, but action is increasingly being 
taken by local authorities in times of unrest. Between 2013 and 2016 more than three 
thousand social media sites were temporarily blocked, mainly in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Net surveillance is legal, but to what extent it is in operation is unknown. However, 
every month thousands of phone taps are granted throughout the country, and there 
are official restrictions on the level of encryption of private and ISP traffic. Official 
requests to access private social media accounts like Facebook are often granted. A 
government agency called Central Monitoring System (CMS) can legally intercept 
online activities like WhatsApp chats directly but is unable to read encrypted 
conversations. Finally, there are known cases of content manipulation, although there 
is no evidence of government involvement in such activities (Freedom House 2017b).
At the same time, there are many checks on government actions intervening in 
ICT. For instance, the nodal agency for cyber security, Indian Computer Emergency 
Team (CERT-IN) reviews all requests to do so by government agencies. After the 
ruling in the so-called Shreya Singhal case in 2015, all blocking orders must be 
accompanied by written explanations and can be petitioned (although the actual 
orders and actions remain confidential; see Arun 2016). Another ruling defines the 
right to privacy on the internet as a fundamental civil right (see Supreme Court of 
India n.d.). Demands on content removal are voiced frequently but seldom enforced 
(Freedom House 2017b).
To sum up, both Pakistan and India seem to have the legal instruments necessary 
to control domestic internet traffic and websites if they wanted to. There are some 
checks on actions carried out by government authorities, more so in India than in 
Pakistan, but in theory content and communication that is seen as against the 
interests of the state and nation could be detected and stopped by the government, 
if desired. So why is questionable content still online, then? One of the reasons, of 
course, is that none of the states under discussion wants to be defined as totalitarian. 
Another reason is that ICT is crucial to the modern state. A third reason is that the 
sheer mass of private users and websites is complex and overwhelming. India is the 
second largest internet consumer in the world, while in Pakistan there are almost 
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fifty million mobile broadband users. There is simply not enough technology and 
staff in place to handle it. Mobility in the virtual terrain is extremely fluid with 
innumerable social media posts and chats simultaneously taking place. Content is 
shared, transformed, copied, and pasted faster than it can be chased down.
It could be objected that the desktop political and cultural activism of a small 
community, such as the Balti people, also has a geographic equivalent that makes 
it easier to control. Many of the users are dependent on local ISPs, and the traffic 
is routed through local servers and limited numbers of gateways. Ruling the 
local network thus looks like a more manageable task. In reality, the systems of 
surveillance, if in place and operable, work inconsistently and intermittently, 
and most of the available resources are directed to cybercrimes and illegal ICT use 
(Freedom House 2017a). Ruling virtual Baltistan is not a first priority for the various 
government agencies occupied with ICT control.
Viewed through the Zomia lens, the virtual terrain is a creative landscape for 
jellyfishing. But more than that, the strategy to take refuge in a virtual terrain 
is indeed similar to that of the tribes residing in the Khyber region, when they 
jellyfished the British attempts to rule by appearing to be without a backbone. The 
ICT backbone that hosts the terrain of virtual Baltistan actually belongs to the ruler—
the nation state. It is a part of the state’s infrastructure and distance-demolishing 
technology. To demolish it in order to overcome the friction of the virtual terrain 
means breaking a part of the state’s own backbone, a price that is too high to pay.
Gone jellyfishing
In the first few pages of the introduction to The Art of Not Being Governed, Scott (2009, 
xi) apologizes for going too far with his sources in arguing for the Zomia case. I could 
have offered a similar apology about the application of his concepts to this case 
study of Baltistan. On closer introspection, however, doing social science research 
is a wider enterprise that sometimes has to include attempts to break out of the 
box, so to speak, to challenge what is normatively considered common knowledge 
in a field of research by trying to reverse common perspectives that are taken for 
granted. To my mind, this is what Graham Allison (1971) did in his study of the Cuban 
missile crisis mentioned at the beginning of my article. I realize that I cannot argue 
with certainty that I am correct about the Balti community’s jellyfishing activities 
within the postcolonial predicaments posed in India and Pakistan, but I do think that 
I have introduced some thought-provoking and fresh ideas of what has been going 
on there since Independence and Partition that merit further examination. Indeed, 
future studies of the region’s situation require a different angle to stimulate new 
approaches.26 “Going too far,” in this sense, has been my objective. It has been my 
intention to rock the boat a bit in order to expand our perspectives on contemporary 
Baltistan. In the process I have also endeavored to provide a preliminary history of 
postcolonial connectivity in the region, compiling some new information and data 
as well as some rather obscure details about it that should shed new light on this 
understudied topic.
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In his introduction, Scott (ibid., xii) also clearly states that the Zomia thesis does 
not hold when applied after World War II, since modern distance-demolishing 
technologies have put an end to the friction of terrain. His statement is, admittedly, 
devastating to my own enterprise here, as I deal almost exclusively with the period 
after World War II. With my exploration of Baltistan in the virtual, ICT-enabled world, 
however, I believe I have demonstrated that the Zomia lens can still be valuable 
in an exploration of the relationship between the nation state and its peripheral 
communities. The virtual terrain works in a way that is similar to the public and 
hidden transcript of the pop-ghazal, discussed in this article. It is ambiguous, as it 
represents both a distance-demolishing technology and, at the same time, a friction of 
terrain that paradoxically becomes a new zone of refuge that is available as a cultural 
and political space for the Balti community beyond the current reach of the state.
What is perhaps specific to a postcolonial Zomia lens is the balance between 
secessionist anti-state nationalisms, such as the one propagated by the Baltistan 
Movement, and making demands on those states for civil rights and access to 
development resources. In the eyes of the state it may imply a willingness from the 
side of the movement to let go of its demands if the price is right (Minow 1995).
Finally, as suggested by Anderson (2006, 166), jellyfishing can be a double-edged 
strategy to deploy, since it 
snips up bits of earlier local memories, genealogies, folktales, cosmologies, and so 
forth, melts them down, and tries to recast them into a powerful, structurally sin-
gular narrative. One can say that these snippets “survive” but one feels that that is 
stretching the meaning of the word . . . this transformation of time is a force at least 
as demonic as it is salutary. It hollows out pasts and it destroys presents. (ibid., 183)
Seen from this perspective, the strategy and dangers behind the postcolonial 
reinvention of Baltistan are perhaps not so much different from those of the 
homogenizing strategies deployed by the state to incorporate its peripheral 
communities into the master narrative of the nation state.
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Notes
1. For some examples of post-independence sub-nationalist movements in South Asia, see Mitra 
(1995, 62).
2. The numbers vary greatly, depending on the sources being consulted. Karl DeRouen and Paul 
Bellamy (2008, 587) argue that there are no exact figures but estimate a range of 5–15 percent. 
At the same time, a 2012 Pew Survey quoted only 6 percent of respondents claiming to be Shi‘ah 
(see Pew Research Center 2012). The disparity most likely has to do with the Shi‘i use of taqīyya 
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(dissimulation) as a way of hiding their religious affiliation under threat of persecution. See 
Korom (2003, 12, 99–100, 230–31).
3. Named after the Sunni cleric Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, one of the founders of Anjuman Sipah-e-Saba.
4. It later lost the Anjuman (Association) to become Sipah-e-Sahaba (Guardians of the Prophet’s 
Companions), then Millat-e-Islamia (Nation of Islam), and now Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (People of 
the Traditions and the Community), a Deobandi Muslim organization.
5. Hardas: 1,480, Wakha: 1,773, Turtuk: 3,371, Taksi: 886, and Thang: 103. The villages in the Shyok 
Valley are in an area taken by the Indian army in the 1971 war with Pakistan. Data cited from 
Census of India (2011a, 2011b).
6. Nurbakhshi is a branch of the Kubrawiyah Sufi order that became Shi’ite during the Safavid 
dynasty in Persia (1501–1732 ce). According to legend, it was introduced into Baltistan during the 
sixteenth century (or was it?) and has stayed intact despite proselytizing movements (Esposito 
1995, 272; Glassé 1989, 304; Rieck 1995).
7. For a thick description of life along the LoC and the relationship to Kashmir, see Gupta (2013a).
8. It is now a section of National Highway 1D.
9. Also known as Pakistan National Highway 35, China National Highway 314, and Asian Highway 
AH4.
10. When I took this route back in 1992 it was still a very rough jeep track beyond Astore Valley. 
The route is now called “Deosai Park Road” and the area has become a national park.
11. Strategic Highway 1.
12. Douglas Dakota DC3s were used extensively to transport troops and supplies to Ladakh 
and Kargil. The first Dakotas landed in Leh as early as in 1948. Pilots would fly freestyle up the 
Himalayan valleys and land on unprepared surface. The Indian Air Force was using the DC3 for 
so-called “sorties,” flying into areas that were more or less surrounded by enemy lines (Mankotia 
2016).
13. Air Mantra attempted to run seventeen-seater civil flights from Kargil in 2013 but went out of 
business shortly thereafter.
14. “Harvard” was the British name for the small, single-engine training aircraft At-6 or T-6 
Texan designed by North American Aviation. In the 1971 Indo-Pak war the Pakistan Air Force 
actually used it in combat to disrupt Indian transport convoys.
15. I am indebted to Yousuf Hussain Abadi, a local historian from Skardu, for this detailed 
information about Skardu Airport.
16. Orient Airways was founded in India in 1946. After Partition the airline decided to run its 
business in Pakistan and later (1955) became Pakistan International Airways (PIA).
17. Aerei da Transporto Regionale or Avions de Transport Regional (Regional Air Transport).
18. AKF, now Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), is funded by His Highness the Aga Khan, 
the 49th Imam of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims, who are in majority in this part of Baltistan. 
Some agricultural projects were also run by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
19. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, my informants must remain anonymous to protect 
their own well-being.
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20. The eight recognized scheduled tribes were Balti, Beda, Bot, Drokpa/Dard/Shin, Changpa, 
Garra, Mon, and Purig-pa (van Beek 1995, 35). The Indian Census in 2011 lists twelve tribes.
21. The Constitution of the Islamic State of Pakistan, Articles 28 and 251.
22. Accessed April 18, 2021, https://apkpure.com/bcdf-balti-elementary-book/com 
.wBCDFBaltiElementaryBook_6136813. APKPure.com is a website providing Android apps that 
are no longer available from Google Play.
23. Magnus Marsden (2005) has made similar observations in his study of a Sufi ghazal band 
known as The Nobles that performs in Chitral, located in northwestern Pakistan. In his analysis, 
the band’s indigenous khovār lyrics provided a way for the local community to “handle and 
respond to the pressures to Islamise,” to resist the imposition of “puritanical visions of Islam,” 
and to continue what were increasingly being labeled as non-Islamic local cultural traditions 
(ibid., 124).
24. Spyware is a kind of software that can be remotely installed on a device without the user 
knowing about it, often by piggybacking on normal updates of ordinary software. FinFisher is 
an IT company based in Germany that develops and sells solutions for “offensive IT intrusion” 
(FinFisher n.d.).
25. Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 69A, Information and Technology Act, 
Section 5, India Telegraph Act.
26. Such as the rich collection of essays in a recent special issue of South Asian History and Culture 
dedicated to Gilgit-Baltistan; see Holden (2019).
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